The appetite for profit spreads to more institutionalized activities than what is done directly to, or with, food for economic gain. I have often maintained that we should be talking about “industry fraud” instead of the narrow focus on “food fraud”. I have also mentioned elsewhere that the emerging business of selling partial food fraud mitigation solutions expands the very problem that the purveyors are purporting to address. By their own admission, those who sell partial and ineffective solutions, particularly through the 3rd-party certification route, agree that their solutions do not solve the problem. So, why do they continue to sell them? It requires very little imagination, if at all, to know that a company can complete a documented Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment (FFVA), implement measures that it sees as sufficient to mitigate food fraud that affects its operation, get certified, then commits fraud. In fact, under current 3rd-party certification arrangement, it is very likely that one company may judge another company as presenting a low risk of committing food fraud if that second company is certified against the same scheme. In other words, the food fraud mitigation solutions that have been suggested under the certification arrangements are not only short in their anticipated effectiveness. They could actually be counter-productive instead of being preventive.
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